Opinion

Artificial Intelligence

Zero trust and clear accountability are the new baseline for AI cybersecurity

AI penetration across all walks of life and business must be seen as an international security problem

AI penetration across all walks of life and business must be seen as an international security problem. Image: Getty Images/iStockphoto

Etay Maor
VP, Threat Intelligence, Cato Networks
  • Traditional cybersecurity frameworks must evolve to treating AI as an international security problem that requires heightened risk control and accountability.
  • Much-touted "AI misuse" encompasses three distinct critical risks that creators are struggling to control.
  • Enterprises cannot wait for policy to catch up and must proactively manage AI with zero-trust principles

The recent resignation from Anthropic of the influential AI researcher Jacob Coxan, and his viral post warning about the threat to humanity, has set off alarms. But this wasn’t the first alarm call about AI’s existential risk. Security incidents like Hugging Face proved how AI systems pursue their own objectives in ways their creators never intended or anticipated. AI misbehaviour and misuse are credible risks, and we need to address them.

The term “AI misuse" is often thrown around casually, yet it actually refers to three distinct scenarios worth pointing out:

  • Humans exploiting AI: For incursions that used to require high expertise, frontier models lower the bar for novice threat actors to conduct exploits, fraud and cybercrime.
  • AI models escaping labs: This might look straight out of a spy thriller: When OpenAI came to help machine learning platform Hugging Face investigate its security breach, it found its own model behind the incident.
  • Chasing the wrong goal: Not all misbehaving AI agents are malicious; many are simply optimizing for the metrics they are measured on, rather than the outcomes their designers intended.

Focus on the trend and not examples

Sceptics point to cases where AI systems pursued the wrong goal and say the agent was unintentionally misled, and that fear around AI is simply overblown. Alarmists point to certain safety test findings to prove their point. For instance, as part of a cyber-evaluation, an AI model was provided open internet access with no security guardrails. Taking advantage of the wide access, the model routed traffic through the Tor anonymity network, contacting real people and organizations outside the test. It sent files containing harmful material and planted instructions for other AI agents to find and reuse later.

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While it's true that the conditions in such tests don't reflect how these models are actually deployed to the public, they're precisely the state attackers want an AI model to reach. They steal API keys to bypass usage limits; copy an open model and retrain a smaller version (called distillation), stripping out safety behaviour and writing jailbreak prompts to talk a model out of its own refusals.

The debate between skeptics and alarmists will continue, but what is indisputable is that AI systems are taking actions that concern their own creators, and the pace of AI model improvement is getting harder to predict.

CIA needs a second ‘A’

The three pillars of security have always been CIA: confidentiality, integrity and availability (ensuring systems and data remain accessible and usable when needed). But as AI deployments rise, it's time to add a second A, which is accountability. Think of it in terms of the hard lines drawn around certain advancements, e.g. human cloning. The underlying science makes it achievable, but hopefully the process is not being executed. Voluntary restraint around AI development might be the way forward, but some AI labs don't view this approach favourably. They argue that voluntary restraint can't survive competitive pressures between companies and nations. Accountability shouldn’t be voluntary, but deliberately built and enforced.

AI penetration across all walks of life and business must be seen as an international security problem. Threat actors are using AI to attack government agencies, defence contractors and critical infrastructure, making a solid case for federal action rather than a patchwork of rules and regulations.

An idea that keeps coming up in discussions is a “kill switch” that shuts down a model before it starts misbehaving. This sounds good in theory but in a real-world scenario, incidents can go undetected for months. Damage will have already been done before anyone presses the kill switch.

Mitigation should focus on mandatory incident reporting, independent evaluations, containment standards, and firm rules on securing model weights and API keys.

Don’t wait for policy to play catch up

While policies are being drafted, enterprises shouldn’t wait for them to catch up and expose themselves to doomsday scenarios. Start by not treating AI like ordinary software. Think of it like a digital insider with its own goals and motivations. Here’s what can be done:

  • The core principles of zero trust – assume breach, never trust by default and grant the least access necessary – must be applied to AI. Assume that at some point, the AI agent will act where it shouldn’t. Do not grant standing access to an agent just because it’s authenticated once. Narrow its scope as much as possible.
  • Don’t assume a valid login makes an action safe, and don't base your trust in an AI system holding the right credential. Every action of the AI must be evaluated on its own. Think through the prism of fraud detection, where someone logging into a bank account with the correct username and password doesn't raise a red flag, but the same account adding a new payee in another country, followed by an immediate wire transfer, does.
  • Avoid probabilistic instructions like “you are not allowed to delete files” that live inside the model and depend on its own discretion. Determined attackers can work around these. Use hard guardrails that include technical restrictions enforced outside the model. These include network segmentation, scoped credentials, sandboxing and rate limits that can limit blast radius.
  • Defenders have to compress their own timeline to match the machine speed of attacks. Patching, detection, mitigation and prevention must happen in real time, not on a quarterly review cycle. Enforce and accelerate the OODA loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) across every device, user and cloud application.

The alarms around AI deserve serious attention. But taking them seriously means creating an AI-resilient framework built to address present-day and future warnings.

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