Why the satellite communications boom needs stronger cyber resilience

Satellite communication is fast becoming a cornerstone of global digital infrastructure.

The world’s active orbital fleet has surged to more than 18,000 satellites, as of September 2026, driven by a dramatic drop in launch economics, largely due to reusable rockets and the rapid deployment of Low Earth Orbit (LEO) constellations.

Starlink, the largest low-Earth-orbit broadband constellation, is now available in more than 160 markets, according to the company’s coverage information. This is bridging critical visibility and communication gaps in rural communities and on maritime routes where traditional fibre and mobile networks are unavailable or disrupted.

As a result, the satellite communication market is on an aggressive growth trajectory. It is projected to rise from $14.56 billion in 2025 to $33.44 billion by 2030, representing an 18.1% compound annual growth rate.

But this rapid expansion of satellite communication is also introducing systemic cybersecurity exposure that governments and businesses must consider and address as this technology becomes even more embedded in everyday life.

According to the International Telecommunication Union, satellite systems architecture is divided into three parts: the user segment, the space segment and the ground segment. Together, these segments enable end-to-end connectivity between users and terrestrial networks.

The user segment involves a terminal, such as a dish on a building, transmitting data to orbiting satellites in space. The space segment consists of one or more satellites deployed across different orbital bands. LEO generally refers to orbits below about 2,000km, MEO to orbits of roughly 2,000–35,786km, and geostationary orbit to an orbit approximately 35,786km above Earth’s equator.

These satellites are connected, with each receiving uplink signals from ground stations or adjacent spacecraft, performing onboard processing and retransmitting data to designated coverage areas on the ground.

The ground segment includes gateway Earth stations and control facilities that oversee satellite operations, support telemetry and command functions, and maintain bidirectional communication with the satellites in orbit.

This architecture enables near-global coverage and infrastructure-independent connectivity. It positions satellite networks as a critical complement to terrestrial infrastructure, or ground-based communication networks and facilities, particularly in remote, underserved or disrupted environments.

While satellite communication technology has existed for decades, recent geopolitical developments, increased commercialization and rapid technological advancements have significantly reshaped the landscape. This has made satellite communications increasingly important to national resilience.

Understanding four of the trends currently shaping the satellite sector is essential to building global communications resilience:

The rapid expansion of commercial LEO constellations has transformed satellite broadband, delivering major economic and connectivity benefits. It has also opened new frontiers for the space economy – from orbital data centres to in-space manufacturing and tourism.

At the same time, this growth is increasing systemic concentration risk. This concern was highlighted at a United Nations Security Council meeting, Risks and challenges emanating from the uncontrolled use of low-Earth orbit satellites, held in December 2025.

As of March 2026, a single commercial constellation accounted for the majority of all active satellites in orbit, underscoring the concentration of critical connectivity infrastructure. This creates a potential single point of failure. A cyberattack, service disruption or policy decision affecting one provider could cascade across sectors and borders, disrupting critical communications and services.

Satellite direct-to-device (D2D) marks a new paradigm in connectivity, enabling direct communication with mobile handsets and Internet of Things (IoT) devices. Whether integrated with terrestrial infrastructure or deployed as an independent satellite connectivity layer, D2D extends coverage, improves service continuity and strengthens resilience.

This expands the connectivity footprint, creating a more complex security perimeter. D2D introduces satellites, Earth gateways stations, supporting network services and a diverse range of endpoints – smartphones, IoT sensors, wearables, handheld terminals – into the communications ecosystem. As the ecosystem expands, so does the attack surface.

D2D creates new trust dependencies across the connectivity chain, potentially reducing end-to-end visibility, affecting attribution and increasing the complexity of protection and incident response across terrestrial and space-based environments.

Beyond the horizontal growth of D2D adoption, satellite connectivity is also being absorbed into the fabric of specific industries, each with its own security profile.

In the automotive sector, vehicles increasingly incorporate satellite-enabled services, including positioning, emergency SOS and connectivity when terrestrial networks are unavailable. The global satellite connectivity market for the auto industry is projected to reach $25.8 billion by 2034, up from $5.6 billion in 2025.

On another front, satellite-enabled IoT is expanding across logistics, agriculture and utilities, with an estimated 2.5 – 3 billion IoT devices now addressable by satellite. As these connections become part of operational monitoring and control in these industries, the risks go beyond data loss. A compromised link or manipulated sensor data could disrupt operations, compromise safety or damage infrastructure. This extends cyber-physical risks to areas that were previously less exposed.

Traditionally, satellites and ground systems were treated as separate entities, with satellites operating largely as fixed “bent pipes”. These are satellites that act as repeaters, continuously passing signals without processing the data.

Software-defined satellites (SDS) are changing this by integrating space and ground systems into a more flexible, software-driven architecture. This enables in-orbit reconfiguration and greater operational efficiency. But it also introduces new risks, including remote manipulation, unauthorized access and malicious or compromised software updates.

These emerging trends will have implications for satellite communication development, but it is also important not to lose sight of the well-established threats associated with satellite technologies. This includes jamming, eavesdropping and unauthorized access to telemetry.

All of these evolving developments warrant a closer look at where current security and regulatory measures may fall short. Governments and businesses must examine how new dependencies could affect global communications resilience. They should also consider whether regional regulatory requirements and geopolitical factors should affect procurement decisions and how collaboration could support resilience.

As space-based networks become foundational to global communications, they create a highly interconnected attack surface, raising critical cybersecurity challenges that require ongoing evaluation.